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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Title 28 U.S.C. S 2253, which was enacted as Part of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"), in relevant part provides: 
 
       . . . 
 
       (c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 
       certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken 
       to the court of appeals from -- 
 
       . . . 
 
        (B) the final order in a proceeding underS 2255. 
 
       (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under 
       paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a 
       substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
       right. 
 
Prior to AEDPA, a 28 U.S.C. S 2255 petitioner could pursue 
an appeal from denial of a S 2255 petition without first 
obtaining a certificate of appealability ("CAPP"). The motion 
presently before us raises the question whether, in the 
wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lindh v. 
Murphy, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997), the CAPP 
provisions apply to an appeal taken after the effective date 
of the AEDPA1 from an order denying a motion under 28 
U.S.C. S 2255 that was filed before that date. We hold that 
they do not. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
 






In February 1996, John Peter Skandier moved in the 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to 
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 2255. In February 1997, after the district court 
denied his motion, Skandier filed a timely notice of appeal. 
This court advised Skandier that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2253(c)(1), he would have to obtain a CAPP from the court 
before his appeal would be entertained. Skandier then filed 
a CAPP request in which he claimed, inter alia, that 
S 2253(c) should not apply to him because his S 2255 
motion was filed in the District Court before April 24, 1996, 
the effective date of AEDPA. By order dated May 27, 1997, 
a panel of this Court declined Skandier's CAPP request, 
reasoning that Skandier had failed to make the substantial 
showing of a denial of a constitutional right that is required 
by 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(2). Skandier then filed a petition for 
rehearing en banc, which was denied. 
 Before us now is Skandier's "motion for reconsideration 
and reinstatement," which we shall construe as a motion to 
recall the mandate and for reconsideration. Skandier 
repeats his contention that S 2253(c) does not apply to his 




In Lindh, the Court was presented with the question 
whether a portion of AEDPA dealing with state habeas 
corpus petitions in noncapital cases applies to petitions 
pending when AEDPA was passed. The Court held that it 
does not. The crux of the Court's analysis reaching this 
conclusion was a distinction between AEDPA's amendments 
to chapter 153 of Title 28 and the newly enacted chapter 
154. According to the Court's reading of the legislative 
history of the Act, Congress intended to apply the 
amendments to chapter 153 (of which S 2253 is a part) 
"only to such cases as were filed after the statute's 
enactment (except where chapter 154 otherwise makes 
select provisions of chapter 153 applicable to pending 
cases)." Lindh, 117 S.Ct. at 2063. The amendments to 
chapter 153 include those amendments bearing onS 2255 
 




motions. AEDPA created chapter 154 of Title 28 to deal 
especially with habeas corpus proceedings against a state 
in capital cases. See Lindh, 117 S.Ct. at 2063. 
 
The basis for the Court's distinction between chapters 
153 and 154 is its reading of S 107(c) of the Act, 110 Stat. 
1226, which provides that the new chapter 154 "shall apply 
to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this 
Act." The Court holds that since Congress "was reasonably 
concerned" about ensuring the retroactive application of 
chapter 154, it would have been "just as concerned" about 
the retroactive application of the chapter 153 amendments 
if it had desired the same result. 117 S.Ct. at 2064. In 
other words, by negative implication the presence of 
S 107(c) indicates that Congress did not intend for those 
amendments to chapter 153 not expressly made applicable 
to pending cases elsewhere in the text of AEDPA to be 
applied to such cases. The Court concludes: "We hold that 
the negative implication of S 107(c) is that the new 
provisions of chapter 153 generally apply only to cases filed 
after the Act became effective." Id. at 2068. 
 
As additional support for its conclusion, the Court also 
discusses the newly enacted 28 U.S.C. S 2264(b). In brief, 
S 2264(b) (which is part of chapter 154) provides for the 
application of S 2254(d) and (e) (which are part of chapter 
153) to pending cases. The Court concludes that there 
would have been no need for Congress to provide expressly 
for the retroactive application of 2254(d) and (e) if it had 
intended for chapter 153 to apply generally to all cases 
pending when the Act took effect. See id. at 2066-68. 
 
Although there is some disagreement over the meaning of 
the "generally apply" wording, see Tiedeman v. Benson, ___ 
F.3d. ___, 1997 WL 437181 (8th Cir. 1997), discussed infra 
at p. 6-8, we believe that the most plausible reading of the 
Court's language is that the amendments to chapter 153 
should not be given retroactive effect unless expressly 
provided for elsewhere in the text of the Act. We believe that 
this reading is most consistent with the tenor and analysis 
of the Court's opinion in Lindh. Thus, sinceS 2253(c) is 
part of chapter 153, we find that that section should not 
apply to a S 2255 motion that was filed before AEDPA's 
 




effective date. This conclusion is in accord with the clear 
weight of authority. 
 
Consistent with our understanding, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit has interpreted Lindh as entailing that 
the certificate of appealability provisions of S 2253 may not 
be applied to appeals from denials of both S 2254 habeas 
petitions and S 2255 motions that were filed before AEDPA's 
effective date. Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1120 (5th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Carter, 117 F.3d 262, 1997 WL 
374754 at *1-*2 and n.1 (5th Cir. July 8, 1997); United 
States v. Roberts, __ F.3d __, 1997 WL 420166 (5th Cir. 
July 24, 1997). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
has reached the same conclusion. Arrendondo v. United 
States, __ F.3d __ , 1997 WL 459716 at *1 (6th Cir. August 
13, 1997)(citing Carter). Additionally, in the wake of Lindh, 
the First Circuit has issued an amended practice order 
providing that its Interim Local Rules 22.1 and 22.2 
(pertaining to the processing of certificates of appealability) 
apply only "to the processing of non-capitalS 2254 and 
S 2255 petitions . . . which were filed on or after April 24, 
1996." Amended Practice Order (1st Cir. July 22, 1997). 
See also Martin v. Bissonette, ___ F.3d ___, 1997 WL 
374793 at *3 (1st Cir. July 11, 1997) (in Lindh the Supreme 
Court held that "AEDPA does not apply to habeas petitions 
which were pending at the time the new law took effect"). 
 
We also note that unpublished opinions in two other 
circuits reach the same result: United States v. Gonzales, 
1997 WL 415334 at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. July 24, 1997) 
("Because Gonzales filed his S 2255 motion prior to the 
effective date of the [AEDPA], no certificate of appealability 
is required"); United States v. Turner, 1997 WL 431824 at 
*1 (10th Cir. August 1, 1997) (same, characterizing Lindh as 
"holding that 1996 amendments requiring a certificate of 
appealability in S 2255 cases do not apply to cases filed 
before the effective date of the amendments" even though 
section 2255 was not specifically addressed in Lindh). 
Although we would not ordinarily rely on unpublished 
opinions, which normally are not precedential, we view 
those opinions as the functional equivalent of the First 
Circuit's practice order, establishing the internal practice to 
be followed in the respective circuits with respect to the 
appeals from denials of S 2255 petitions. 
 




Broad language in recent cases from other of our sister 
circuits involving various provisions of chapter 153 
suggests that most courts agree with our interpretation of 
the scope of Lindh. Johnson v. Washington, ___ F.3d ___, 
1997 WL 381206 at *11 n.5 (7th Cir. July 9, 1997) ("We are 
aware that the United States Supreme Court has recently 
decided that the new provisions of Chapter 153 of the 
[AEDPA] . . . are not applied retroactively to pending 
cases."); Reddick v. Haws, ___ F.3d ___, 1997 WL 409422 at 
*4 n.1 (7th Cir. July 22, 1997) ("Reddick's petition was filed 
before the [AEDPA] became law. The provisions of that act 
therefore do not govern our review of his claims."); Amaya- 
Ruiz v. Stewart, ___ F.3d ___, 1997 WL 426215 at *1 n.1 
(9th Cir. July 31, 1997) ("Amaya-Ruiz filed his petition prior 
to the passage of the [AEDPA]. The new provisions of 
Chapter 153, therefore, do not govern our resolution of this 
appeal."); Contreras v. Schiltgen, __ F.3d __, 1997 WL 
426213 at *1 (9th Cir. July 31, 1997) ("Because Contreras' 
petition was filed prior to April 24, 1996, this appeal is 
unaffected by the [AEDPA].").2  
 
In contrast, in Tiedeman v. Benson, supra, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the similar 
question whether a certificate of appealability is required in 
an appeal from the denial of a S 2254 petition where the 
petition was filed before April 24, 1996, and the appeal was 
filed after that date. The court reached the opposite 
conclusion from that reached in the cases cited above, 
reasoning: 
 
       Whatever changes the AEDPA has made with respect to 
       appeals by habeas corpus petitioners are procedural 
       only. The notice of appeal, together with Tiedeman's 
       application for a certificate of appealability, was filed 
       after the enactment of the AEDPA. We recognize that 
       the Supreme Court in Lindh . . . has held that the 
       amendments made by AEDPA to Chapter 153 . . ., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Indeed, before Lindh was decided this Court had reached the same 
conclusion concerning certain changes made by AEDPA with regard to 
second or successive petitions. Burkett v. Love , 89 F.3d 135, 138 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1996) ("The present petition had been filed before that amendment 
to S 2254 was enacted, and consequently, it does not apply here."). 
 




       generally speaking, are prospective only. The particular 
       provision of the law at issue in Lindh, however, had to 
       do with the substantive standards for review of state 
       court judgments by habeas courts. In stating its 
       holding at the end of its opinion, the Court said that 
       "the new provisions of Chapter 153 generally apply 
       only to cases filed after the Act became effective" . . . 
       (emphasis ours). The parties to this case agree that the 
       new provisions with respect to certificates of 
       appealability made no substantive change in the 
       standards by which applications for such certificates 
       are governed. Moreover, we can think of no reason why 
       a new provision exclusively directed towards appeal 
       procedures would depend for its effective date on the 
       filing of a case in a trial court, instead of on the filing 
       of a notice of appeal or similar document. 
 
Id. at *2. 
 
The Eighth Circuit's analysis turns on the penultimate 
sentence of Lindh: "the new provisions of chapter 153 
generally apply only to cases filed after the Act became 
effective." 117 S.Ct. at 2068 (emphasis added). From this 
use of "generally" the Tiedeman court determines that the 
Supreme Court meant to say that not all provisions of 
Chapter 153 apply only prospectively, and, we infer, that 
typical rules of statutory construction (e.g. distinguishing 
between substantive and procedural amendments) should 
apply to reach the conclusion that S 2253(c) should have 
retroactive application. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994)(setting forth default rules of 
construction with regard to retroactive application). 
 
We disagree. The essential message of Lindh, we believe, 
is that we need not resort to a Landgraf analysis with its 
default rules of retroactive/prospective application when 
the intent of Congress is clear and no Constitutional 
violation would be worked by applying the statute as 
Congress intended. The Tiedeman court's reading of the 
"generally apply" language as permitting application of 
some arguably procedural sections to pending cases is 
undermined by the Supreme Court's analysis of S 107(c) 
and S 2264(b). The Court could not assert that none of the 
chapter 153 amendments have retroactive effect when 
 




S 2264(b) expressly allows for an exception. We conclude 
that the most plausible reading of the Court's language is 
that the amendments to chapter 153 should not be given 
retroactive effect unless expressly provided for elsewhere in 
the text of the Act, and that that reading is most consistent 
with the tenor and analysis of the Lindh. 
 
Thus, since S 2253(c) is part of chapter 153, we hold that 
that section should not apply to a S 2255 motion that was 
filed before AEDPA's effective date. Because we dispose of 
this case on the grounds of Congressional intent, as the 
Supreme Court itself has found it, we need not address the 
matters that would be predicate to determining applicability 
of the default rules. 
 
Nor are we persuaded that the filing of a notice of appeal 
after AEDPA's effective date institutes a new proceeding 
such that we could find that Skandier's case was not 
pending on April 24, 1996, and thus that the new S 2253(c) 
should apply. Rather, we believe that the better view for 
present purposes is that there is but one case, which 
commences with the filing of the petition or motion and 
continues through the appellate process. Thus, so long as 
the S 2255 motion was filed before April 24, 1996, there 
was a case pending on that date even if the notice of appeal 
was filed after that date. At all events, we are controlled by 
Lindh, and our decision here is compelled by the Court's 
reasoning in that case. 
 
We conclude, then, that because Skandier's S 2255 
motion was filed before April 24, 1996, S 2253(c) as 
amended by AEDPA does not apply to his appeal from the 
denial of that motion, and that he should not have been 
required to obtain a certificate of appealability before his 




In the present case, we address this issue not in the 
context of a request for a certificate of appealability but, 
after such a request and a subsequent petition for 
rehearing had been denied, in the context of a motion to 
recall the mandate and for rehearing. We must also decide, 
 
                                8 
 
  
therefore, whether this is a situation in which the mandate 
should be recalled. 
 
In American Iron & Steel Institute v. E.P.A., 560 F.2d 589, 
594 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978), we 
joined other courts of appeals and held that we have the 
authority to recall a mandate. We concluded that while a 
decision to recall a mandate is discretionary, it is an 
extraordinary remedy to be used only in unusual 
circumstances to prevent injustice or otherwise for good 
cause. Id. We also noted that courts have listed five types 
of situation which would justify recalling a mandate, one of 
which is where a subsequent Supreme Court decision has 
shown that the original judgment was wrong. Id. 
 
We believe that the circumstances of the present case 
warrant the recall of the mandate. The AEDPA is not a 
model of the legislative drafter's art. Rather, as the 
Supreme Court has noted, "in a world of silk purses and 
pigs' ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory 
drafting." Lindh, 117 S.Ct. at 2068. One result has been the 
uncertainty concerning the applicability of the AEDPA to 
habeas petitions filed before April 24, 1996. For the reasons 
given above, we believe that Lindh has clarified the matter, 
discerning a Congressional intent not to allow the 
application of the chapter 153 amendments to pending 
cases unless specifically provided for elsewhere in the Act. 
To that extent, this case falls within the criterion listed 




For the foregoing reasons, the mandate will be recalled 
and this Court's order dated May 27, 1997, denying 
Skandier's request for a certificate of appealability will be 
vacated. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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